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Abstract: Marshall’s asset equilibrium model provides a way of 
explaining the identity of entrepreneurs. Keynes adopted this model but 
transformed it when he emphasized the short-period and volatile 
character of long-term expectations. This entails a view of entrepreneur 
identity in which radical uncertainty plays a central role. This in turn 
deepens the post Keynesian view of uncertainty as ontological in that 
entrepreneurs’ survival plays into their behavior. This paper explores 
this role-based view of individual identity and uses the analysis to 
comment on Keynes’s ideas for the socialization of investment and 
euthanasia of the rentier in the last chapter of The general theory. 
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When the capital development of a country becomes a by-
product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-
done (Keynes 1973 [1936], 159). 
 
[…] though this state of affairs would be quite compatible with 
some measure of individualism, yet it would mean the 
euthanasia of the rentier (Keynes 1973 [1936], 375-376). 
 
 
Keynesianism in the tradition of Keynes is a theory of a monetary 
economy in time guided by individuals’ expectations of the future. 
There is no permanent state of rest in a monetary world, and the 
equilibria that emerge are temporary and transient. But this does not 
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imply that everything in the economy is in flux. Not often appreciated is 
that this view of the economy implies a conception of economic agents 
as enduring through change. Economic agents act today on expectations 
about an economy that they themselves expect to face tomorrow. 
Whether or not their expectations about the economy are fulfilled, and 
however the economy changes, they nonetheless act on the assumption 
that they continue as essentially who they are—else it would make little 
sense to make plans for tomorrow. That is, though the economy is a 
system of change, and though much also changes in the characteristics 
of economic agents, including the disappearance of some (through 
bankruptcy or voluntary withdrawal), when economic agents act, they 
act as if they retain their respective identities through time. The concept 
of agent identity, then, is an implicit tenet of Keynesianism and a 
correlate of the idea of a monetary economy as a system of change. 
From this perspective, Keynesianism is thus a theory of the economy in 
time based on the idea that there are agents who survive through time 
by managing the consequences of time.  
Post Keynesians, of course, have extensively investigated the role    
of expectations in the economy, but relatively little post Keynesian 
research investigates the properties of economic agents specifically seen 
as enduring beings, particularly those agents under the greatest burden 
of negotiating time, namely, entrepreneurs and investors (in contrast to 
consumers and workers who are generally treated as largely passive 
agents). However, it can be argued that the theory of uncertainty in 
Keynes’s later thinking and in post Keynesianism offers a basis for 
explaining the identity of agents when its ontological dimension is 
emphasized.  
Uncertainty in an ontological sense means that what occurs in the 
world is not predetermined by some set of economic ‘fundamentals’ 
underlying behavior (Davidson 1996). This entails that what individuals 
do today can have an impact on what happens tomorrow, leading them 
to form expectations about what effects they can have on what happens 
to them tomorrow. Thus expectations in an ontologically uncertain 
world have a dual character in that they refer to both identity (of 
economic agents) and change (in the economy). Accordingly, the basis 
for investigating the nature of economic agents as enduring beings    
can be found in Keynes’s thinking about individuals’ formation of 
expectations in an uncertain world. 
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This paper attempts to develop a modest analysis of this last 
proposition. It does so by looking back to the roots of Keynes’s thinking 
about time in his inheritance of Marshall’s thinking about time and 
subsequent critique of that thinking. The argument builds on my 
previous work on the identity of individuals, where I proceed in an 
ontological-criterial manner, evaluating different candidate conceptions 
of the individual in economics according to whether ‘individuals’ as they 
are described can indeed be regarded as distinct and re-identifiable, as 
is required by the concept of an individual (Davis 2003; Davis 
forthcoming). I use that framework here, but focus not on individuals in 
general but rather on the particular type of individual responsible for 
the central role investment plays in Keynesian and post Keynesian 
thinking, namely, the individual/entrepreneur, whose identity is 
explained in both Marshall and Keynes in terms of asset holdings. My 
general conclusion is that the departure Keynes made from Marshall’s 
view of the identity of the individual/entrepreneur is important for 
understanding investment in monetary economies guided by 
individuals’ expectations of the future. Thus identity matters to our 
understanding of the economy.  
Of course neither Marshall nor Keynes reasoned explicitly in terms 
of agent identity. Yet they both made claims about the nature of the 
entrepreneur that bear on what the identity of the entrepreneur 
involves. Both their conceptions, moreover, satisfy my individuation and 
re-identification criteria, though Keynes’s view of time and uncertainty 
in a post-Victorian, post-‘fundamentals’ world has altogether different 
consequences for our understanding of the economy. Let me add that an 
additional implication of the approach taken in the paper is that 
different types of agents have different types of identities, so that the 
functioning of the economy needs to be understood in terms of the 
interaction of identifiably different (or heterogeneous) types of 
economic agents. I do not discuss this implication here, but restrict the 
paper to the topic of the identity of the individual/entrepreneur. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I 
briefly review Keynes’s thinking about uncertainty and its appraisal in 
recent post Keynesian economics in connection with the emphasis 
placed on ontological as opposed to epistemological uncertainty. Here I 
also attempt to explain why the investigation of agent identity may be of 
value to post Keynesianism, in order to motivate interest in the 
argument of the paper. The second section discusses the antecedents of 
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Keynes’s thinking about entrepreneurs in time in Marshall’s early theory 
of asset market equilibria dating back to his 1871 essay on “Money”, 
which Keynes praised. It then uses this discussion to reconstruct a 
Marshallian theory of the agent identity of the individual/entrepreneur. 
The third section turns to Keynes’s own approach to asset market 
analysis, emphasizes its departures from Marshall’s understanding,   
and then constructs an alternative view of the agent identity of 
individuals/entrepreneurs appropriate to Keynes’s view of the economy. 
Section four offers brief summary remarks regarding the status and 
nature of individual/entrepreneur identity in a world in which 
Keynesian economic policy dominates. 
 
1. KEYNES ON UNCERTAINTY 
Keynes’s thinking about uncertainty originally derives from his thinking 
about the concept of probability and the weight of arguments in his 
1921 Treatise on probability. In the Treatise, uncertainty has both 
epistemological and ontological dimensions. Regarding his concept of 
probability, understood to mean the degree of belief individuals may 
have in uncertain propositions, he distinguishes four cases: 
 
There appear to be four alternatives. Either in some cases there is  
no probability at all; or probabilities do not all belong to a single set 
of magnitudes measurable in terms of a common unit; or these 
measures always exist, but in many cases are, and must remain, 
unknown; or probabilities do belong to such a set and their 
measures are capable of being determined by us, although we are 
not always able so to determine them in practice (Keynes 1973 
[1921], 33, original emphases). 
 
The first case clearly concerns an ontological claim, and was 
famously emphasized many years later in Keynes’s 1937 defense of his 
The general theory of employment, interest and money (1936), in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. There Keynes asserted that with respect 
to long-term investment decisions, “there is no scientific basis on which 
to form any calculable probability whatever” (Keynes 1973 [1937], 113). 
The three other cases are more epistemological in nature. The second 
concerns non-comparability and accordingly the limits of our knowledge 
in regard to how probability is to be measured; the third concerns what 
can and cannot be known regarding probabilities that exist; the fourth 
concerns the limitations imposed on knowledge associated with our 
practices regarding data generation and estimation procedures. 
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Regarding the weight of arguments, Keynes is there concerned with the 
amount and completeness of the relevant evidence an agent has 
regarding the probability of a given outcome. Low weight refers to 
insufficient and/or incomplete evidence, which is an epistemological 
concern. This concept of weight re-appears in The general theory in 
connection with Keynes’s emphasis on how the ‘state of confidence’ 
affects investment: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to 
attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain”, whereas, “It is 
reasonable […] to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about 
which we feel somewhat confident” (Keynes 1973 [1936], 148; see Runde 
1990).  
That Keynes understood uncertainty to be both epistemological and 
ontological, and placed special emphasis on the latter, is argued by 
Davidson and others to be particularly important for understanding 
Keynes’s view of the economy (Davidson 1996; also McKenna and 
Zannoni 2000-2001; Rosser 2001; Dequech 2003, 2004, 2006; Wilson 
2009). Where epistemological uncertainty is involved it is possible that 
individuals may learn the probabilities relevant to their decision-making, 
but where ontological uncertainty is involved no such learning is 
possible. In that instance, Davidson follows Shackle (1972) in saying this 
implies that some states of the world are not predetermined but remain 
to be determined as a result of the actions we undertake. The economy 
is nonergodic. Or as Dequech puts it, “under fundamental uncertainty,” 
that is, ontological uncertainty, “the innovator creates new opportunities 
and new states of the world” (Dequech 2003, 527).  
Important to this argument is whether states of the world that are 
not predetermined are nonetheless possible under the laws of nature, 
since it can be argued that if they are possible then the innovator cannot 
really create them. Creativity can still be maintained in a weaker sense 
as the idea that innovators help bring about particular possible states of 
the world—which ones depending on their actions—and thus help 
realize the future under conditions of fundamental uncertainty (see 
Wilson 2009). Another issue is whether people moderate and reduce 
uncertainty through recourse to rules of thumb and conventions which 
tend to determine future states of the world, a matter emphasized by 
Keynes in connection with his account of investment behavior (Keynes 
1973 [1936], 152). In effect, strategies for reducing epistemological 
uncertainty also reduce ontological uncertainty. 
DAVIS / UNCERTAINTY AND IDENTITY: A POST KEYNESIAN APPROACH 
VOLUME 3, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2010 38 
However we assess these issues, it is still fair to say that Keynes’s 
thinking about uncertainty gave special emphasis to ontological 
uncertainty, and that this gives the economy a nonergodic, historical, or 
even evolutionary character in which agents’ actions play a creative role. 
Note, then, that this ‘creative’ role can explain dynamic growth in the 
economy when ‘animal spirits’ are high, and it can also lead to quite 
destructive economic consequences when long-term expectations are 
disappointed or there is damaging speculative behavior that depresses 
output. A nonergodic world has no predetermined pathway, and thus 
our interest lies in what the effects of agents’ actions are. Keynes’s 
interest, of course, was in their consequences for output and 
employment. Yet he certainly knew that behind these aggregate 
phenomena individuals are also affected, even if this was not a subject 
he often specifically addressed. Thus, taking economic agents as 
relatively enduring, might we also ask in parallel fashion how their 
identities are affected as a result of their actions? If there is no 
predetermined pathway for the economy, then it seems there is also no 
predetermined identity pathway for its agents. It follows that we must 
include in our analysis of undetermined possible future states of the 
world what may happen to the individuals as well. 
I suggest there are two rationales for this extension. One is that it 
potentially offers a deeper understanding of the nature of long-term 
expectations. Long-term expectations are often simply treated as 
subjective, or as perhaps depending on group dynamics and average 
expectation as in Keynes’s beauty contest explanation. But it may be 
that we can add to this understanding if it can be argued that agents’ 
orientation toward the future reflects a concern regarding the extent to 
which their identities as entrepreneurs are at risk.1 The second rationale 
lies in the possible advantages of better understanding Keynes’s reliance 
on and revision of Marshall’s early asset market equilibrium thinking, 
which Lawlor argues “became Keynes’s basic supply and demand meta-
theory for asset markets” (Lawlor 2006, 28). My suggestion is that our 
understanding of this too can be enhanced with a better understanding 
of the agents concerned with portfolio management. In the following 
                                                 
1 In my earlier discussion of how Keynes’s philosophical thinking developed (Davis 
1994) I make interdependent belief expectations central to Keynes’s The general theory 
(Keynes 1936) understanding of conventions and average expectation. That argument, 
however, is not framed in terms of entrepreneur identity, but rather in terms of 
Keynes’s rejection of his own early philosophical thinking as inspired by G. E. Moore’s 
intuitionism (Moore 1903). 
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section I begin from this latter vantage point, and argue that it        
offers an early framework for explaining the agent identity of 
entrepreneurs/individuals. The section after looks at how Keynes 
revised this asset market equilibrium framework, and comments on the 
implications this has for thinking about the personal identity of 
entrepreneurs as creative agents. 
 
2. MARSHALL’S ASSET MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND ENTREPRENEUR IDENTITY 
The 1871 essay on “Money” 
The earliest source of Marshall’s asset market equilibrium analysis is  
his 1871 essay on “Money”, later published by Whitaker (Whitaker 1975; 
see Lawlor 2006, 108ff.). Marshall began with a complaint about the 
monetary theory of his time. He pointed out that the standard 
explanations of the value of money were not formulated in terms of the 
same systematic supply-and-demand analysis used in the determination 
of the exchange value of commodities, but were rather formulated in 
terms of such things as money’s rapidity of circulation or its cost of 
production. He then argued that it was individuals’ determination to 
hold a stock of money that determined its value, and that these 
decisions were not made in isolation from their decisions to hold    
other assets. Consequently, since the demand for all assets involves a 
balancing of the opposing advantages the individual expects to derive 
from each, the value of money needed to be determined in terms of its 
relative advantages and disadvantages compared to all other assets 
individuals held. Marshall put this in terms of the simple choice one 
might face between owning a productive asset—his example is a horse—
and holding a stock of non-interest bearing coin. Whether one wants the 
horse or the coin depends on how one chooses to apportion one’s 
wealth given the respective ‘conveniences’ and ‘inconveniences’ of these 
two assets at the margin. The value of money, then, was established in 
the same way as the value of any other asset through supply-and-
demand and marginalist reasoning. 
From an equilibrium perspective, individuals are consequently seen 
as being in a state of equilibrium with respect to their portfolio choices 
over different wealth holdings. At the same time, however, individual-
level equilibrium analysis needs to be accompanied by a market-level 
equilibrium analysis, since the market values of all assets individuals 
hold are equalized by the forces of supply and demand in the trading 
between individuals. Thus Marshall’s general asset market equilibrium 
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analysis sees each entrepreneur as being in individual equilibrium, and 
equilibrium simultaneously obtaining between all entrepreneurs with 
respect to all the different possible assets people can hold. Moreover, as 
an analysis of assets the framework is intertemporal. Productive assets 
can generate returns in the future, and money provides the means for 
transactions people wish to carry out today (one liquidity motive, as we 
would call it). Thus as individuals make their portfolio choices they do 
three connected things: they determine what combination of assets best 
suits their own individual situations, they make their own positions 
consistent with those of others, and they do all this over time. 
 
Entrepreneur identity 
Let us then treat this analysis as a framework for explaining 
entrepreneurs’ agent identities as manifested by their asset holdings. In 
the most basic sense, identity analysis is simply an accounting system 
for keeping track of some kind of distinguishable entity through a 
process of change that is believed to be important for the purposes of 
some explanation. If you claim you can refer to some type of 
distinguishable, persisting entity you think important to your analysis, 
in principle you need to be able to show what makes that entity a 
separate and distinct thing in terms of how you have described it, and 
then show how you can track it as that separate and distinct thing 
through a process of change that may alter many of its characteristics. 
Explaining the identity of that entity then makes it possible to go on to 
argue how it may or may not function as a causal agent, able to affect its 
environment as well as be affected by it. In economics, of course, we are 
concerned with economic agents, and in Keynesian and post Keynesian 
economics we are interested especially in one particular type of 
economic agent, the entrepreneur, or, in Marshall’s framework, the 
individual managing a set of asset holdings. Thus, explaining 
individuals’/entrepreneurs’ agent identities as manifested by their   
asset holdings involves mobilizing some essential description of 
individuals/entrepreneurs that allows us to individuate and track them 
over time despite change in their non-essential characteristics, such as 
which particular assets they hold in their portfolios, who they trade with 
and when, and the like. 
I suggest, then, that the ‘essential description’ of the 
individual/entrepreneur that Marshall offers in his 1871 essay includes 
three connected things entrepreneurs do when they make portfolio 
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choices, and which are instrumental to their characterization as 
distinguishable, enduring entities with agent identities. First and most 
basically, individuals are distinguishable independent beings in virtue of 
their exclusive identification with the assets which they own. That is, the 
system of private ownership for stocks, bonds, real estate, bank 
deposits, and so on, provides a straightforward means of distinguishing 
entrepreneurs as independent agents. Second, it nonetheless goes too 
far to say that entrepreneurs are isolated atomistic beings, since for 
Marshall the actual values of the assets they own are determined in 
interaction with other entrepreneurs. As what they are made up of is not 
just a matter of the assets they hold but also obviously a matter of the 
value of those assets, entrepreneurs are only relatively autonomous and 
thus both independent and         also interdependent beings. Third, 
Marshall’s entrepreneurs are also enduring, re-identifiable beings in 
that, whatever the mix of assets they happen to own, their wealth 
portfolios are always seen as being in equilibrium at any point in time 
and thus through time as well.  
This equilibrium property is crucial because it elicits what is 
essential in entrepreneurs’ identity as asset-holders when there is 
continual change in the mix of assets they own. Were they to be 
identified solely as collections of assets without the equilibrium 
principle, they would then be collections of multiple selves, each 
different from moment to moment according to changes in their 
portfolios. But here individuals are enduringly distinct beings, because 
their identities are tied to their ability to exercise an equilibrium 
principle regarding the management of their asset holdings—the idea of 
balancing the conveniences and inconveniences of different assets at the 
margin. With these three components in mind, then, let us go on to see 
what further interpretation we can give to this agent identity conception 
by looking at Marshall’s later treatment of time and his distinction 
between short-term and long-term expectations in his Principles (1920).  
In the Principles Marshall provides a ‘real’ theory of interest in terms 
of the demand and supply of capital. Long-term expectations are driven 
by the productivity of capital which motivates investment decisions, 
whereas short-term expectations are determined by current production. 
Further, long-period values, or ‘normal’ values, reflect the deep 
underlying factors such as the marginal productivity of resources, 
marginal disutility of saving, and so forth, that Marshall believed 
ultimately explain the functioning of the economy. Short-period 
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phenomena depend on other more transient factors, and accordingly 
adjust in the long run to the former. Applying this to the asset market 
equilibrium characterization of individuals above, it follows that 
individuals ultimately guide their lives by long-term expectations 
regarding their durable investments. That is, the mix of assets in their 
portfolios reflects thrift and steadfastness in their preference for 
holding long-term investments, at the expense of liquidity and frequent 
adjustment to one’s holdings.  
Hedging and speculation cannot pay off in the long run for Marshall 
because they are responses to transitory phenomena out of keeping 
with the fundamentals underlying the economy. Consequently, 
entrepreneur/individual identities are, as it were, highly secure in that 
stability in their personal portfolios through time gives their identities 
an enduring nature. Put differently, as their identities are securely 
distributed across time by this long-term orientation, despite the 
continuous process of transitory change in markets, they are effectively 
‘out’ of time. Their equilibrium identity principle, that is, allows them to 
defeat time by organizing their identities around the deep, timeless 
values residing in fundamental scarcity relationships that for Marshall 
hold between human life and nature. We thus might say that this late 
nineteenth century concept of entrepreneur identity is classically 
Victorian in that the established values of thrift and hard work 
associated with that era underlie the pre-eminent role that long-period 
‘normal’ values in Marshall’s economic analysis play in individuals’ 
organization of their lives vis-à-vis time. 
 
3. KEYNES ON ASSET MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND ENTREPRENEUR IDENTITY 
Keynes on Marshall and asset market equilibria 
To understand Keynes’s thinking on asset market equilibria, I begin with 
his adoption and re-assessment of Marshall’s distinction between the 
short-period and long-period. As a Marshallian, Keynes used Marshall’s 
time distinction, but his development of the idea of the economy as a 
monetary economy made short-period equilibrium the key concept, and 
not a temporary state ultimately overcome by the gravitational pull of 
long-period forces as was the case for Marshall. This inversion of 
Marshall’s thinking followed from Keynes’s changed view of the 
character of long-term expectations. Thus for Keynes, as essentially with 
Marshall, short-term expectations are concerned with the price the 
entrepreneur can get for finished output, and are generally fulfilled, or 
DAVIS / UNCERTAINTY AND IDENTITY: A POST KEYNESIAN APPROACH 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 43 
revised in a predictable way, in light of market performance. But in 
contrast to Marshall he believed that long-term expectations, which are 
concerned with future returns on additions to the entrepreneur’s capital 
stock, were often disappointed, and moreover it is often unclear to the 
entrepreneur why this was the case. Keynes inferred from this that long-
term expectations consequently never really settle down and, absent a 
rational basis in the calculation of expected returns, are driven by 
investors’ animal spirits. Part of the reason for this was that the rise of 
stock markets, associated with the historical shift in capital holdings 
away from privately-held family/entrepreneur firms toward rentier-  
type investors, made long-term expectations more changeable and 
unpredictable. The development of stock markets also gave rise to 
speculative behavior. In contrast to Marshall’s late nineteenth/early 
twentieth century experience, then, it was simply no longer clear what 
drove long-period expectations. Keynes recognized this historical 
development, and consequently shifted the focus of Marshallian analysis 
from the long-period to the short-period to give “the theory of a system 
in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the 
present situation” (Keynes 1973 [1936], 293). In fact, for Keynes there is 
really no longer any long-period as everything occurs in the present. 
Rather the long-period, as Lawlor says, is “just a succession of changing 
regimes of long-period expectation” that impacts us from one present to 
the next (Lawlor 2006, 19). 
Given this, Keynes still held a high opinion of the basic ideas 
involved in Marshall’s monetary theory as well as of the asset 
equilibrium model on which it depended. In his biography of Marshall 
(Keynes 1925), the content of the 1871 essay and Marshall’s early 
monetary thinking in general were discussed quite favorably. (Indeed, 
Keynes specifically requested a copy of the essay from Mary Paley 
Marshall in order to write the biography.) But Keynes’s later 
development of this framework in The general theory also significantly 
changed it by expanding upon the reasons individuals might find some 
assets to be ‘convenient’ to include speculative expectations regarding 
their possible appreciation.  
The idea of speculative expectations, of course, was entirely foreign 
to Marshall’s thinking since it allows for expectations not grounded in 
real factors but rather in transitory phenomena. It also introduces a 
dimension into the determination of asset values altogether at odds 
with Marshall’s thinking about individual behavior, since speculation 
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allows opinion to influence individuals (such as Keynes described in his 
beauty contest example), and draws them away from the economy’s 
fundamentals. For Marshall, the deep factors that determine economic 
behavior lay in the relationship between human beings and nature, not 
between human beings per se. That is, social relationships for him 
needed ultimately to be somehow ‘naturalized’.  
 
Keynes on entrepreneur identity 
How, then, does all this change the Marshallian entrepreneur identity 
conception for Keynes? In Marshall’s asset equilibrium model of 
entrepreneur identity, the entrepreneur’s identity is sustained across 
change in the variety of assets that make up the entrepreneur’s portfolio 
through the entrepreneur’s preference for holding long-term 
investments. In effect, if we look at entrepreneur identity in terms of 
how entrepreneurs position themselves towards time, the particular 
interpretation Marshall gives to this, by favoring long-term investments, 
gives individuals an identity through time largely through their 
minimizing the significance of time. People endure as entrepreneurs 
because they make choices with respect to their holdings that make 
time unimportant. However, in inverting Marshall’s expectations 
analysis, Keynes produces quite a different view of entrepreneur 
identity. As the short-period becomes the only period and time 
contracts to the present, entrepreneurs shift their portfolios away from 
long-term commitments, constantly revising the mix of assets that they 
own. The unsettled character of long-term expectations, then, removes 
their ability to be ‘out’ of time, forcing them to be ever ‘in’ time in the 
sense that they are ever changing what they own and thus who they are. 
Accordingly, in Keynes’s world entrepreneurs cease to be enduring, re-
identifiable agents. Rather entrepreneurs fragment into successions of 
unconnected episodic selves, where the most that can be said to link 
each entrepreneur’s multiple selves is their common desire for short-
term portfolio gain.  
Moreover, on Keynes’s view entrepreneur identity is always at risk. 
When entrepreneurs are identified with the assets they own, then, since 
they no longer maintain long-term positions as the core of their 
portfolios, should they sustain serious losses they are threatened with 
elimination as agents and individuals altogether. On an asset identity 
model of the entrepreneur, that is, their losses are not to a financial 
portfolio separate from the individual but in fact losses to the individual 
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identified with that portfolio. Thus, just as a financial portfolio might go 
bankrupt and cease to exist, so might the entrepreneur identified as a 
portfolio go bankrupt and cease to exist. In our ordinary way of 
thinking, of course, we maintain a separation in our minds between 
individuals and what they own, allowing us to imagine that individuals 
continue and may somehow sustain their identities should they go 
bankrupt and cease to be wealth owners. But the analysis here does not 
distinguish between agent identity and personal identity, and indeed in 
the economic world as Marshall and Keynes described it individuals are 
subsumed by the roles they play in the economy, so that difference 
arguably does not exist there either. Thus, in a world that has become 
thoroughly economic in nature, the risk that Keynesian entrepreneurs 
face in losing their ‘identity’ portfolios makes the unsettled character of 
long-term expectations an even more serious matter.  
It is not just an institutional change in the way market economies 
began to work in the early twentieth century with the rise of stock 
markets and speculative investing that then underlies Keynes’s shift of 
focus to the present and changed view of long-term expectations. When 
we take the basis for entrepreneurs’ agent identity to be the Marshallian 
asset equilibrium model, Keynes’s changed view of the world also 
signals a different understanding of the culture of the market system 
whereby uncertainty becomes a deeply ontological concern for 
entrepreneurs themselves. For them, accordingly, radical uncertainty is 
not only about what entrepreneurs cannot know about the future (an 
epistemological uncertainty), but also ultimately about whether they 
themselves may even exist in the future (an ontological uncertainty). 
Part of Keynes’s view, we saw, is the special emphasis he places on 
the role that opinion plays in the determination of entrepreneurs’ asset 
choices. Given the analysis of entrepreneur identity above in terms of 
independence, interdependence, and enduringness, what more does this 
then imply about the identities of entrepreneurs? Note that since 
opinion is not grounded in timeless Marshallian ‘fundamentals’ but is 
rather the product of a social interaction that can produce swings in 
investor sentiment, it can generate both bull and bear markets. In the 
former entrepreneurs profit when they go long and hold assets for 
extended periods, whereas in the latter they profit when they go short 
by borrowing and selling assets forward. Thus whether entrepreneurs 
take a long-term perspective going long or a short-term perspective 
going short is in large part a matter of the state of opinion. And, 
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ironically, opinion-driven bull markets inadvertently produce a 
Marshallian-like world from the point of view of entrepreneur identity, 
since they encourage individuals to hold long-term positions.  
But Keynes had no confidence that such a circumstance would 
prevail over any significant period of time. It should not be overlooked 
accordingly that, in the last chapter of The general theory, Keynes 
argued for ‘socializing investment’ and for the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ 
as means by which he hoped stability and growth might be brought to 
capitalist market systems. Of course he was not advocating socialism or 
state take-over of the economy—“[i]t is not the ownership of the 
instruments of production which it is important for the State to 
assume” (Keynes 1973 [1936], 378). Rather, he was interested in whether 
the state could develop policies and strategies which might influence 
the nature of entrepreneur behavior by encouraging long-term holding 
of capital assets and reducing short-termism in the way entrepreneurs 
approached their asset portfolios. That is, Keynes essentially sought the 
state’s assistance in ensuring a more stable climate of opinion that 
would channel entrepreneurs’ animal spirits in the direction of a more 
Marshallian-like world.  
In terms of the view of entrepreneur identity set forth here, Keynes 
hoped public authorities might help stabilize the opinion-influenced 
interdependence component of entrepreneur identity and thereby 
reframe entrepreneur independence in such a manner as to restore their 
status as enduring, re-identifiable agents. Markets themselves already 
threatened to euthanize the rentier. Keynes was willing to lend his 
assistance, particularly as a step in the direction of ensuring the survival 
of the entrepreneur as the key economic agent in the capitalist market 
economy. But this required more realism regarding the social side of the 
entrepreneur as well as practical measures aimed at changing how 
interdependence figured in entrepreneur identity.  
 
4. KEYNES AFTER MARSHALL 
Thus Keynes is still a Marshallian, albeit one who learned from the 
history he experienced. He shares the Marshallian entrepreneur   
identity conception implicit in the asset equilibrium model, but his 
understanding of the early twentieth century evolution of asset markets 
caused him to think more deeply than Marshall had about entrepreneur 
interdependence. This reflects two ways in which Keynes’s ontological 
view of the world was different from Marshall’s. First, though the 
DAVIS / UNCERTAINTY AND IDENTITY: A POST KEYNESIAN APPROACH 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 47 
structure of Marshall’s model is retained, and though Marshall’s long-
run normal values are preserved, they are not retained as ‘natural’ 
normal values but rather as socially-produced normal values. Contrary 
to Marshall, human beings play an important role in determining the 
relationship between the economy and nature and do not find that 
relationship naturally given to them in the form of a collection of pre-
given ‘fundamentals’. Second, in a Keynesian world with socially desired 
economic policy in command, individuals are again ‘out’ of time, and 
thus confident in making long-term commitments that ignore the risk of 
time, but they are so only when they produce consensus in opinion 
regarding employment and output goals—a matter strictly ‘in’ time in 
the sense of requiring social recognition of the need to manage time. 
That is, as post Keynesians argue, we only succeed in managing the 
consequences of time and uncertainty when we see the economy as 
inescapably in time, that is, as a monetary economy.  
The Victorian world Marshall inhabited ended in 1914 when it could 
no longer be said that the values of thrift and hard work explained an 
economic process embedded in a world of conflict and power. The 
Victorians saw the world as benign and beneficent, as befit the privilege 
and illusions of Britain’s upper classes which benefited from decades of 
ruthless colonial expansion that had made its victims invisible. The war 
that began in 1914 was in part a product of this nineteenth century 
history, which afterward wrought further damage on the national 
economies that fought it in the form of economic depression and a 
second world war.  
Keynes was raised in this Victorian world, but by 1918 and Versailles 
he was immune to most of its illusions, including that thrift and hard 
work were the natural foundations of economic life. By the end of his 
life he was even more aware of the nature of the kind of world that had 
succeeded Marshall’s. One aspect of this was his worry about the   
fragile state of human society, famously expressed in his cautions in 
“My early beliefs” (1933), and later given more tangible expression in his 
important contributions to the postwar deliberations at Bretton Woods 
in 1944. From an uncertainty perspective, more was involved here, I 
suggest, than his concern about the well-being of the international 
economic system. Implicitly, he was also concerned with whether 
individuals were likely to be able to live ‘in’ time in a world in which 
they so increasingly identified with the roles they occupied in economic 
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life. It is an important concern, but one that has gone largely 
unaddressed by economists since Keynes’s time. 
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